A controlled supply of water is crucial for much of the world's agriculture. This is particularly the case in many of the semi-arid and uneven-rainfall areas of South Asia. While there is considerable amount of work on the management of large canal systems and the structure and practices of the irrigation bureaucracy, economists have only recently started paying attention to issues of local community-level cooperation and other institutional arrangements that are key to substantially improving the existing levels of utilization of irrigation potential.
The usual game-theoretic models of cooperation among self-interested agents in repeated situations of strategic interdependence provide some useful insights. But, in view of their admissibility of multiplicity of equilibria, many of the comparative-static questions cannot be satisfactorily resolved without recourse to contextual data analysis. Besides, these models are often couched in too restrictive a framework, inadequate in capturing some of the salient issues of real-world cooperation (or lack of it); for a long time we will have to depend on arduous empirical work to give us clues about the building blocks to more satisfactory theoretical models and policy action. Much of the existing empirical literature on these issues are social-anthropological, without a great deal of quantification; among other things, this makes deciphering the effect of a particular factor, controlling for other factors, rather difficult.
This paper concentrates on a quantitative analysis of the (physical, institutional and socio-economic) determinants of cooperation in irrigation communities 4 on the basis of a large survey conducted in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu. In section II we describe the variables and the data and our expected effects that the independent variables may have on cooperation, and in section III we report the actual results of the statistical analysis.
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In all data were collected from 48 villages spread over 6 districts in Tamil Nadu, with a selected unit (called 'ayacut') of irrigation system in each village (either a tank or a branch of canal with roughly about 50 hectares size of command area). Half of the irrigation units belonged to canal systems, and the other half to more traditional tank systems. All the canal systems are under the general administration of the government (usually the Public Works Department, PWD). Within tank systems, half belonged to what are called 'isolated or chain tank' systems, and the other half to 'system tanks' (where the tanks were, unlike in the former case, linked to larger irrigation units). Within each system the villages were randomly chosen.
Within each village a stratified sample of 10 farmers (stratified by land size classes) were chosen. Most of the analysis in the paper is, however, on the basis of data for the irrigation unit or the 'ayacut' as a whole; in some cases we have derived data from the individual farmers' response. In general on matters of cooperation differences across villages were much more prominent than intra-village differences among the 10 farmers.
First a few words on the description of the general functioning of the water users'
organizations. The majority of the organizations surveyed are traditional and informal community organizations that have been in existence for some time (27 of the 48 surveyed are reported either as 'traditional' or at least 20 years old). But only 13 of these units have formal associations (and 10 of these have formal associations not at the village or sluice levels but at the more aggregative zonal level). The organization in 12 of the (canal-based) irrigation units surveyed has been set up (relatively recently) and is run directly by the PWD. In another 12
canal-based irrigation units, although PWD is the over-all official agency, it is the traditional village committee that manages irrigation matters at the village level.
There is a great deal of variation among the organizations with respect to appointment of guards as monitors and enforcers, frequency of meeting, mobilization of collective labor, mobilization of funds, method of cost-sharing, and involvement in non-irrigation activities.
5
Most of the users' organizations meet at least once every one to two years; only 9 reported never meeting at all. The units run directly by the PWD reported meeting at most once a year (and often only every two years), while most others meet once or twice a year during the cropping season. Five of the units surveyed have organizations which reported having regular meetings at least 10 times a year. One function of the water users' organization in many of the units surveyed is to mobilize community labor for the purpose of maintaining and repairing the field channels. Generally, it appears that community labor is most common in those organizations that are traditional or have existed for over 40 years. While most of these units mobilize community labor both for regular maintenance and for emergency repairs, several units reported mobilizing community labor only in the event of emergency repairs.
Community labor does not appear to be used systematically in any of those units where the PWD directly runs the organizations.
About three-quarters (37 in number) of the units surveyed have some formal system of fundraising. Of these 28 units have a system of dues, fines and/or taxes. Such a system is most prevalent in those units which are canal-based. In the tank-based systems, an alternate system of fundraising is possible, the sale of collective resources such as fish and trees.
Nineteen of the tank-based units have collective funds which are mobilized this way; 10 of these units supplement the collective fund with a system of dues and/or tax collection. About half of the water users' organizations report participating in other, usually village-wide, activities, such as conducting the temple festival. This does not appear to be true of any of the organizations which are run by the PWD.
Since issues like cooperation and some of its determinants involve the quality of social and economic relations, much of the data are more qualitative (sometimes with yes-no answers) than quantitative, from which we had to construct variables that therefore take only a limited range of values. The description of the dependent and independent variables, including their mean values with standard deviation and the range of variation, is given in Let us now describe and comment upon the explanatory variables that we have used.
One obvious variable to consider is that relating to the group size: We have used a variable called NUMUSERS, which is the number of households 7 using the particular irrigation source (the number varies between 11 and 279, with a mean of 53). The common presumption in the literature on local commons is that cooperation works better in small groups. The early work of Olson (1965) suggested that collective action is easier to organize in smaller groups. In a game played by rotating irrigators (turntakers and turnwaiters) with self-enforced rules (i.e.
without formal guards), Weissing and Ostrom (1990) show in their theoretical model that in the equilibrium an increase in the number of irrigators is associated with an increase in the stealing of water, other things remaining the same. 8 In general, models of repeated games suggest that cooperative strategies are more likely to emerge and be sustained in smaller groups. In small irrigation communities peer monitoring is easier, the 'common knowledge' assumption of models of strategic decisions is likely to be more valid, shared norms and patterns of reciprocity are more common, social sanctions may be easier to implement through reputation mechanisms and multiplex relationships, and even hydrologic needs of farmers may be relatively similar. On the other hand, there may be some positive economies of scale in larger groups, particularly in matters of pooling resources, appointing guards, lobbying with officials, and so on.
Another possibly important explanatory variable is heterogeneity, both social and economic. The only variable in our dataset that relates to social homogeneity or heterogeneity is CASTE75, which takes a value of 1 in villages where at least 75% of the sampled farmers are members of the same generic caste group (in most cases a 'backward' caste group) in the village. By this crude measure, 69 per cent of the ayacuts in our dataset are socially relatively homogeneous. In terms of economic heterogeneity we have a variable called GINI, which measures the Gini coefficient of inequality of landholding of farmers in the ayacut area. The mean value of GINI in our dataset is 0.41.
Theoretically, the relationship between heterogeneity and successful collective action is rather complex. 9 On the one hand, there is the well-known suggestion of Olson (1965) that in a heterogenous group a dominant member enjoying a large part of the benefits of a collective resource is likely to see to its provision even if he has to pay all of the cost himself (with the small players free-riding on the contribution of the large player). On the other hand, there are cases where the net benefits of coordination of each individual may be structured in such a way that in situations of marked heterogeneity or inequality some individuals (particularly those with better exit options) may not participate, and the resulting outcome may be more inefficient. In addition, the transaction and enforcement costs of cooperative arrangements may be high in situations of intra-village heterogeneity, conflicts, and inequality.
Internalization of cooperative norms is more difficult under such circumstances; the degree of confidence or trust that individuals have in the likelihood that others will play their part in a cooperative agreement may be low. In anticipation that the relationship between inequality and cooperation may be non-linear, we have introduced a squared Gini coefficient (called GINISQU) in our set of explanatory variables.
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Another kind of factors that affect cooperation in water management is the physical condition of water availability. In conditions of extreme scarcity arrangements of cooperation often break down. When there is some significant access to water, it pays the irrigators to cooperate in maintaining field channels, and in obeying allocation rules. In our dataset the villages with acute water scarcity in general have less cooperation, but (probably for historical reasons) the water-scarce villages are also more likely to have canal-based irrigation; so the effect of water-scarcity is mixed up with that of possible bureaucratic inefficiencies in release of canal water (more on this below). We have defined a variable AVGACCES to indicate the number of months in a year that the farmers in the ayacut have access to water: it varies from 2 to 7 months, with a mean of 3.7 (2.8 for the canal areas). 11 We have also used two other variables relating to physical conditions: one is TOPOGRPH to indicate where the topographical nature of the ayacut precludes equal access to water for all the farmers; and the other is LINED to indicate where the irrigation channel is lined.
For government involvement we have used two alternate variables, CANAL (to mark half the villages where it is a government administered canal system), and the other is PWDDECID, i.e. where PWD makes all the decisions about water allocation and distribution.
In the canal area villages there is not merely less water availability, water is also more inequitably distributed: in 19 out of 24 canal area villages in our dataset (as opposed to 2 out of the 24 villages served by the tank systems) there is evidence of such inequity of water supply or access. In general, the water release cycles may be more unreliable from the farmers' point of view when they are administered by PWD officials. Of course, there is potentially a major problem of endogeneity here: does the PWD get involved when irrigators' cooperation has failed? 12 After some background checking we have found that the villages where PWD takes all the decisions are all located in Coimbatore district and are precisely those where due to primarily physical reasons of long-term water scarcity a large-scale system of inter-river basin water transfer scheme had been undertaken by the government (called PAP --Parambikulam Aliyar Project ). We therefore think the problem of endogeneity may not be that serious here.
A few variables relate to the locational context of the ayacut in question. The variable TAILEND refers to the cases where the village is situated at the tailend of the irrigation system, which, other things remaining the same, may unite the farmers of the village in their struggle to get more water away from the more favorably located villages. In our dataset 75
per cent of the villages are at the tail end of their respective system. In general only 44 per cent of villages report that there is no conflict with other villages over water. The variable OTHIRRIG is the estimated fraction of the total irrigated land (of the sampled farmers in the ayacut) that is outside the ayacut. For all of these exit option-like variables our prior is to expect a negative effect on cooperation.
14 History of cooperation in a village may matter, as cooperation may be self-reinforcing, or, 'habit-forming', as Seabright (1997) explains in a theoretical model. We have a variable TRADLORG to indicate villages where the water users' organization has been there for 20 years or more. These villages are characterized by more use of community labor in maintenance works and emergencies, are more likely to hire guards (called "neerani" in much of this area) for monitoring and enforcement (indicated generally by the variable GUARD), and to use cost-sharing proportional to land holding (indicated generally by variable SHRPROP). Since the use of guards and a cost-sharing regime may be endogenous, we have used in the cooperation regressions predicted values of these variables, PGUARD and PSHRPROP. We have also asked questions about the farmers' perception about the process of rule crafting. For example, in villages where at least 4 out of 10 sampled farmers believe that the water rules were crafted by the elite, we indicate that by our variable ELITERUL.
(We also had a variable, FAIR, for villages where the rules are generally perceived as fair, but we dropped this variable as it almost coincides with cases of cooperative behavior).
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The regression results are in Tables 2 (A, B , and C), Table 3 (A and B), and Table 4 (A and B). (For some of the independent variables the predicted values are estimated on the basis of first-stage regressions in Table 5 ). We are primarily concerned with the signs of the regression coefficients. 15 Let us start with DISTFDCH, the index of quality of maintenance of distributaries and field channels, as the dependent variable. This index is uniformly lower in ayacuts with higher inequality in landholding: the coefficient for GINI is negative in all of the three alternative cases in Table 2 and highly significant in two of the three cases. (It is interesting to note that a similar negative coefficient for GINI of land distribution has been observed by Dayton-Johnson (1998) for farmer-managed irrigation systems in Mexico, and a negative coefficient for 'variations of income among appropriators' in irrigation systems in
Nepal by Lam (1998) ). The coefficient is also lower, and significantly so, with ELITERUL, i.e. for villages where rules are perceived to be crafted by the village elite.
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As our discussion in the preceding section suggests, the effect of number of users of the irrigation system can be ambiguous. 17 In the ordered logit estimates the coefficient for NUMUSERS is negative but not very significant in one case, and significant at 10% level in another; in another case when we take the number of users per acre of the ayacut area as an alternative, the coefficient is positive but not very significant.
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AVGACCES, the number of months in a year there is access to irrigation, is positively and significantly related to DISTFDCH in all three cases. The interpretation is that when there is access to an irrigation system over a longer period in the year the return to investing effort in maintenance of field channels is higher (and may outweigh the increased maintenance costs that may follow from higher use). 19 The negative coefficient of LINED at first seems surprising 20 , but probably means that when the channels are lined they are more likely to be found occasionally in a 'broken condition', compared to channels which are not lined at all.
(In fact, of the 15 units that are not lined at all, only 2 report the field channels being in bad condition). 21 An alternative explanation, suggested to us by Dayton-Johnson on the basis of his observation in Mexico, is that some poor villages are unable to properly take care of the modern water control structures that tend to accompany lined canals, either because they could not get replacement parts, or because they did not know how to repair them, or both.
Contrary to the general impression about the negative effect of government involvement, the coefficient for PWDDECID is positive and significant in all three cases. It is possible that when PWD is actively involved in water allocation and in maintenance works above the outlet, returns to farmers' collective maintenance effort on channels below the outlet are higher. Looking more closely at the detailed data we find the picture a little more complex: of the 12 units where PWD is actively involved, in half of them the field channels are well maintained, 22 and in the other half of the units they are badly maintained. It is interesting to observe that in the latter half the farmers have more private sources of water (pumps and open wells) than in the former half (and the GINI coefficient of land distribution in the ayacut is considerably higher, i.e., as expected, inequality of land holding goes with more access to pumps and open wells).
The coefficient for TAILEND is positive but not significant. But the coefficient for PRIORAPP is negative, and in one case highly significant. This suggests that water conflicts with other villages may be helping the farmers of the ayacut unite in cooperative maintenance effort.
The variable for urban connections, LINKAGE, has a highly significant negative coefficient in all the three alternate cases in Table 2 . This is consistent with our prior about the adverse effect of exit options on cooperative behavior discussed in the preceding section.
The variable OTHIRRIG, indicating access to alternative sources of irrigation outside the ayacut for the farmers, has an appropriately negative sign, but it is not significant.
The quality of maintenance is understandably highly positively correlated with the existence of a guard, whose enforcement of water distribution rules increases the benefits of field channel maintenance. 23 Since the appointment of a guard is itself dependent on some of the factors that enter into the determination of cooperative behavior, we use here only the predicted value, PGUARD, in this second-stage regression. 24 In the first-stage logit analysis for GUARD, reported in Table 5 , we use as instruments the variables CANAL and TRADLORG. In canal areas there is much less use of a guard, whereas in ayacuts with a traditional organization appointing a guard is quite common. We presume this is determined more by historical-conventional factors. In fact in areas where the government takes the decisions the enforcement of rules is usually by government officials or police, not by guards. 25 The only other variable that is significant (at the 10% level) in the first stage regression for GUARD is LINKAGE: it seems that better urban-linked villages use more guards. But Table 2 suggests that, controlling for the positive effect on PGUARD, LINKAGE has a significant negative effect on maintenance of field channels.
In Table 2 we also see the positive (but not always significant) effect of the proportional cost-sharing rule on maintenance: cost-sharing proportional to landholding may be perceived as more fair than, for example, cases where all farmers have to bear the same cost even though the larger farmers get more of the benefit, or where there is no rule. 26 Since SHRPROP rule may itself be dependent on factors that enter into the determination of cooperative behavior, we use in Table 2 only the predicted value, PSHRPROP. The firststage logit analysis for SHRPROP is reported in Table 5 . SHRPROP is positively and significantly related to the number of ayacut members, inequality of landholding among them, canal areas, ayacuts where the irrigation organization is old, and where formal water rights is more prevalent. 27 Since GINI has a positive effect on SHRPROP (possibly indicating social pressure for a redistributive adjustment of the cost-sharing rule to take account of wealth disparities) and PSHRPROP has a somewhat significant positive effect on DISTFDCH, we can say that the effect of inequality of land distribution on the quality of maintenance on field channels is twofold: on the one hand, the direct effect is negative, but the indirect effect, working through the cost-sharing rule, is positive. 28 Similarly the effect of NUMUSERS is twofold: the direct effect is negative (though not always significant), but the indirect effect, working through the cost-sharing rule, is positive.
Now we turn to the dependent variable in Table 3 , H2OCOOP, i.e. where there has been no intra-village conflict over water over the previous five years. GINI is again significantly negative, but GINISQU is significantly positive, indicating the kind of U-shaped relationship between inequality and cooperative behavior we have discussed in the preceding section. The coefficient for CASTE75 is positive in both cases of Table 3 , and significant in one, confirming that social homogeneity (in the form of 75% or more of the farmers belonging to the same caste group) is conducive to cooperation. The urban connection variable, LINKAGE, is, as before, negative in its effect on cooperation, though significant in one of the two cases. Also as before, PGUARD has a positive effect, but it is significant in one of the two cases. The government involvement variable, PWDDECID, did not turn out to be significant in this set of regressions, but again looking at the detailed data, as in the case of the field channel maintenance regressions, in half of the 12 units where PWD takes all decisions, there was cooperation in water allocation and in the other half there was conflict (and the former associated with more equality in land distribution and fewer private pumpsets and open wells than in the latter).
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In Table 4 the dependent variable is the opposite of cooperation; it is VIOLH2O, i.e.
where water allocation rules are frequently violated by at least one group. (Both for the ayacut as a whole and for the sampled farmers our data definitely suggest that the rule violations are more often by the better-off farmers; one presumes they can get away with such violations more easily). 30 Here the signs of the coefficients for GINI, GINISQU, CASTE75, TAILEND, and OTHIRRIG are as expected from the earlier regressions, but they are not significant.
NUMUSERS is positive and highly significant, indicating the difficulty of preserving cooperative behavior in large groups. AVGACCES, the duration of access to water, is negatively, and in one of the two cases highly significantly, related to violations, indicating that water scarcity encourages violations.
As before, the urban connection variable, LINKAGE, has a negative impact on cooperation, and PGUARD has a positive effect. In one of the two regressions, we have used PMARKET as an alternate outside connection variable to LINKAGE. MARKET is a measure of the extent to which farmers are market-oriented (particularly in terms of sales of produce). Since this may be endogenously determined, we have used PMARKET, the predicted value of MARKET, in the second-stage regression. The first-stage regression is reported in Table This means in all the villages where PWD decides on water allocation and distribution, frequent rule violations are reported: 32 this may be because the rules are typically rigid and insensitive to local needs, farmers are less normatively committed, officials are bribed to look the other way, and so on. (Lam (1998) reports from his study of irrigation systems in Nepal that in nearly half of the government agency managed systems the extent of rule-breaking is medium or high, whereas the corresponding percentage in farmer-managed systems is only about 12 per cent). In contrast, in the villages where the village elite, rather than government officials, crafts the rules, there is no violation of rules reported. Since, as we have noted before, the better-off are usually the more frequent violators of rules, they tend not to violate rules crafted by themselves.
In all of the 12 PWD-run units there are rotational water allocation rules by which the farmers are allotted a certain number of hours of water access per acre or are allowed access to water only in alternate weeks. In all of these 12 units these rotational rules are frequently violated and particularly the rich farmers appropriate more water than is their due. And yet in half of these units (particularly where the inequality in land distribution among the farmers is low), as we have seen before, field channels are well maintained and there was no incidence of water conflicts within the village in the last five years. This means inflexible rules of the government (enforced by corruptible agents) are frequently violated without necessarily damaging intra-village cooperation, suggesting again that when rules do not enjoy the backing of community norms, rule obedience is not necessarily an indicator of cooperation among farmers.
Summing up over the seven regressions in Tables 2, 3 , and 4, we can say that in our dataset cooperative behavior in an irrigation community is by and large significantly related Although this paper is primarily meant to understand the factors underlying farmers' cooperation or lack of it, in terms of policy lessons one may particularly point to the need for devolution of decision-making and rule-crafting authority to the local farmers (instead of imposing insensitive external rules on them), for land reform (which, apart from its direct incentive effects on farm productivity, can get the poor farmers more actively involved in local self-governing institutions), and for caution in minimizing the disruptive effects that the expansion of market linkages and of elite access to private sources of water can have on traditional community arrangements.
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15 Since this is a logit analysis the signs are to be appropriately interpreted as indicating directions of changes in the probability of the dependent variable taking on a particular value with changes in the values of an independent variable, even though in our statement of the results we sometimes do not spell it out fully.
16 From the data of the 480 sampled farmers it is clear that when an average farmer believes that the water rules have been crafted jointly (as opposed to by the elite or by the government), he is more likely to have positive comments about the water allocation system and about rule compliance by other farmers. 17 This is also empirically corroborated by Lam (1998) . 18 In the corresponding OLS regressions neither NUMUSERS nor NUM_ACRE is at all significant. 19 There is reason to believe that the access to irrigation refers more to general accessibility to water sources and structures than to the flow of water through the field channels, so the reverse causation (i.e. better maintained channels implying better access to irrigation water) is an unlikely explanation of the positive coefficient. In fact in general in the canal areas AVGACCES is very low, and yet DISTFDCH is high. 20 Lam (1998) finds a positive coefficient for his explanatory variable on lining, but in a different context comments thus on the design of irrigation infrastructure constructed by the Department of Irrigation (DOI) in Nepal, which may be relevant for our case: "Although the unlined canal was prone to damage, it was easy to maintain. Whenever there was leakage, farmers could easily locate the leaks and seal the leaks with mud. Now that the DOI has lined the canals with bricks, farmers find it difficult to locate the leaks at all. Even if they can locate them, it is difficult to seal them. Farmers complain that there is little that they can do to keep the canal in good condition."
30 For example, in 29 out of 48 villages rule violations are mainly by the rich farmers/upper castes, as reported in the ayacut-level survey. Also at the level of the sampled farmers, the average farmer perception is that the rich (landholding-wise the top 4 out of the 10 sampled farmers in the village) comply with rules significantly less than the poor (the bottom 4 out of the 10 sampled farmers), particularly in water allocation and financial cost-sharing. 31 About 44 percent of the villages in our dataset have a market for well water. 32 We also have evidence in our dataset that the farmers contribute to the village collective fund much less when the government is involved, presumably because the government is then assumed to be the financier of last resort. GINISQU is the square of the value of the variable GINI GINISQU is the square of the value of the variable GINI; PGUARD and PMARKET are the predicted values of the variables GUARD and MARKET respectively. 
